II. NATURAL GAS PRODUCTION: RIGHTS, MARCELLUS SHALE, AND PENNSYLVANIA

A. Regulatory Changes to the Structure of the Natural Gas Industry
Before the 1980s, natural gas producers explored for natural gas, maintained gas wells, and sold gas at the wellhead to pipeline companies at federally regulated prices. 15 Pipeline companies then refined the gas into a marketable form, transported that refined gas to market, and sold it to local distribution companies at value-added prices that accounted for refining and transportation costs. 16 Producers calculated landowner royalty payments based on the price they initially received at the wellhead, not the price at which pipeline companies sold the marketable gas. 17 As a result, when the General Assembly passed the GMRA in 1979, the sale at the wellhead served as the only point of sale for calculating royalties. 18 In the 1980s, fears of pipeline monopolies led the federal government to require pipeline companies to decouple transportation services from sales services "and, in effect, provide common-carriage services to others, including gas producers, who wished to transport natural gas."
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19 That change to the gas industry's structure impacted how lessee producers currently calculate natural gas royalty payments. 20 
B. Gas Rights and the Role of Leases in Natural Gas Production
The United States is unique in the fact that people privately own mineral rights. 21 In most other countries, the government owns and engages in mineral extraction. 22 Typical U.S. landowners do not conduct gas extraction or production because they lack the necessary expertise and resources, instead leasing their rights to people who have the requisite expertise and resources. 23 Because of the structure of U.S. mineral rights and the private nature of leases, leases take on "potentially infinite variations." 24 When discussing lease variations, attorney and practitioner George A. Bibikos once described a gas lease as the "heart of [the] relationship" between a property owner and a lessee and a means to realize royalties. 25 Under both the old, regulated structure of the natural gas industry and the current, deregulated structure, the lessee natural gas company bears one hundred percent of the production costs, essentially consisting of everything needed to extract the gas from the wellhead, and one hundred percent of the risk of loss during production. 26 After deregulation of the natural gas industry, production companies began investing in infrastructure and midstream, or post-production, activities.
27 Post-production costs, consisting of everything needed to get the gas from the wellhead to the point of sale, became subject to contract and negotiation. 28 Natural gas companies began including special royalty provisions in leases to 19 Id. 20 
See id.
21 SEREC Hearing, supra note 4 (statement of G.A. Bibikos). 22 Id. 23 Id. 24 Id. 25 Id. 26 Id. 27 Id. 28 
Id.
ISSN 0041-9915 (print) 1942-8405 (online) • DOI 10.5195/lawreview.2015.384 http://lawreview.law.pitt.edu account for post-production costs. 29 In Pennsylvania, production costs remained non-deductible. 30 According to Bibikos, the practice of deducting post-production costs recreates the previous Pennsylvania practice of providing a one-eighth royalty payment at the wellhead. 31 His theory asserts that, by allowing gas companies to deduct one-eighth of post-production costs from the valuation of gas at the point of sale, gas companies pay a royalty that is equivalent to a one-eighth royalty that landowners would have received had the old, regulated structure of gas production still existed. 32 Bibikos then added that gas companies do not deduct Act 13 impact fees or regulatory costs that occur during the production phase. 33 
C. The Marcellus Shale Formation
The Marcellus Shale Formation is a large, underground rock formation rich in natural gas that underlies several states, including much of Pennsylvania.
34 Natural gas proponents promote Pennsylvania's Marcellus Shale gas reserve as a clean, safe alternative to coal and a key to U.S. energy independence. 35 The Marcellus Shale reserve is the second largest natural gas reserve in the United States and potentially holds 168 to 500 trillion cubic feet of natural gas. 36 In 2012, unconventional gas resources like Marcellus Shale made up fifty percent of U.S. natural gas production. 37 Estimates value Marcellus Shale natural gas at over $1 29 Id. 30 Id. 31 Id. 32 Id. 33 Id. In order to extract natural gas from rock pores, vertical fractures, and mineral grains, gas companies utilize hydraulic fracturing ("fracking") and horizontal drilling. 40 Extractors began fracking for natural gas in the 1940s. 41 Today, extractors mix millions of gallons of water with sand and chemicals, inject it thousands of feet below the surface, and fracture the rocks. 42 By holding fractures open, sand allows gas to escape more quickly. 43 Horizontal drilling allows extractors to remove more gas from a single well site, reducing negative surface impacts. 44 Waste, flowback, and produced waters from fracking contain radioactive materials and chemicals and must be handled and treated properly in order to avoid water contamination and health issues. 45 Because fracking and horizontal drilling have made the Marcellus Shale reserve more accessible, gas companies have offered landowners more profitable leases over the past few years. 46 In response, the increased compensation in new leases has corresponded with some landowners reviewing and questioning the validity of their old leases under the GMRA. In Kilmer v. Elexco Land Services, Inc., the Pennsylvania Supreme Court interpreted the GMRA as allowing gas companies to use the "net-back method" to apply post-production cost deductions to royalty payments under natural gas leases. 48 Passed by the General Assembly in 1979, the original GMRA provided that a lease or similar agreement conveying the right to remove or recover oil, natural gas or gas of any other designation from lessor to lessee shall not be valid if such lease does not guarantee the lessor at least one-eighth royalty of all oil, natural gas or gas of other designations removed or recovered from the subject real property.
49
The royalty owners in Kilmer claimed that their "lease violated the one-eighth royalty requirement of the GMRA because the net-back method resulted in a royalty less than one-eighth of the value of the gas." 50 Central to the case was the absence of a definition of "royalty" in the GMRA. 51 While the General Assembly considered such absence, it did not rectify the situation with its recent GMRA amendments.
52
At the time of Kilmer, many Pennsylvania natural gas leases, including the one at issue in Kilmer, "calculate[d] the royalties as one-eighth of the sale price of the gas minus one-eighth of the post-production costs of bringing the gas to market." 53 That calculation, called the "net-back method," aims to determine the gas' value at the wellhead "by deducting from the sales price the costs of getting 48 Id. at 1158. 49 the natural gas from the wellhead to the market." 54 The Kilmer court adhered to the gas industry's definitions of production costs as the "expenses of getting gas to the point it exits the ground" and post-production costs as the "expenditures from when the gas exits the ground until it is sold." 55 Importantly, the Kilmer lease expressly stated that the lessee would deduct one-eighth of the post-production costs from the sales proceeds while expressly defining the costs within its terms.
56
Applying Pennsylvania's rules of statutory interpretation, the Kilmer court sought to determine the General Assembly's intent by first looking at the "plain language of the GMRA."
57 Although the GMRA expressly required lessors to receive a one-eighth royalty, the GMRA did not define the term "royalty," nor did it contain key terms at issue, including "'at the wellhead,' 'post-production costs,' or 'point of sale.'" 58 The Kilmer court reasoned that, because the point of sale occurred at the wellhead at the time of the GMRA's enactment, the General Assembly intended that royalty calculations occur only at one instance: the point of sale at the wellhead. 59 However, because the point of sale no longer occurs exclusively at the wellhead, the Kilmer court had to determine "which valuation point [was] most consistent with the language of the statute" and the definition of the term "royalty."
60 Following Pennsylvania's legislative rule for interpreting technical words, phrases, and the like with their "peculiar and appropriate meaning" acquired through use, the Kilmer court rejected the plain meaning of "royalty" and adopted the gas industry's definition of the term.
61 Accordingly, the gas industry has defined "royalty" as a portion of the proceeds from sale in which the royalty owner 54 does not share the production expenses but may share the post-production expenses.
62
Stating that landowners can receive royalties in-kind (i.e., receive a portion of the gas in lieu of receiving a payment), the Kilmer court concluded that the "General Assembly [did] not intend to create a situation where one landowner would receive a dramatically increased royalty when the product [was] valued at the point of sale when the neighbor who took the royalty in-kind would have a reduced royalty based on the wellhead value." 63 The Kilmer court based this conclusion on the fact that companies sell natural gas at different levels of processing, potentially resulting in "dramatically" different royalty payments. 64 It then concluded that "[t]he use of the net-back method eliminates the chance that lessors would obtain different royalties on the same quality and quantity of gas coming out of the well depending on when and where in the value-added production process the gas was sold."
65
In addition, the Kilmer court rejected concerns about gas companies potentially inflating post-production costs in order to reduce royalty payments. 66 It reasoned that, because gas companies pay seven-eighths of the post-production costs, these companies maintain a strong incentive to minimize costs. 67 The 66 Id. 67 Id. 68 Id. On June 27, 2013, the Pennsylvania Senate Environmental Resources and Energy Committee ("SEREC") conducted a public hearing regarding transparency issues with royalty payments, check stubs, and deductions of natural gas development post-production costs from royalty payments. 69 A number of state senators, representatives, and other interested parties attended the hearing. 70 All testifying parties supported the natural gas industry and Marcellus Shale development. 71 However, their testimonies highlighted several issues, including: lack of uniformity in gas leases; lack of uniformity in post-production deductions; lack of explanations of and clarity in post-production deductions; applications of retroactive deductions and charges to royalty payments by at least one company following the Kilmer decision; unequal bargaining power between landowners and gas companies; costs to lessors for challenging lease violations and/or postproduction deductions; and the need for a legislative definition of the term "royalty." The National Association of Royalty Owners ("NARO") represents about 8.5 million royalty owners and educates them about royalties and deductions. 73 The average owner is over sixty years old, widowed, and receives less than $500 per month in royalty payments to supplement his or her income. 74 The royalty payment 69 See SEREC Hearing, supra note 4. 76 According to David Sikes, President of NARO, a lull in Pennsylvania's gas production activity left the legal framework behind, and "litigation did not keep up with the technology." 77 Importantly, not all gas companies are to blame for the current situation, as some companies take no deductions. 78 However, excessive deductions still remain a major issue, even for some operators who worry that large deductions will ruin the industry's reputation. 79 Royalty deductions have ranged from zero to one hundred percent of royalty payments.
80 Some royalty payments reported at the SEREC Hearing totaled $40,000 per month, while other payments had zero-dollar value. 81 In some cases, deductions even exceeded payments.
82 Chesapeake Energy Corp. ("Chesapeake") appeared to be the biggest perpetrator, with deductions in two examples ranging from twenty-seven to one hundred percent per well per month. 83 One example from Chesapeake had at least fifteen possible deductions.
84
The absence or presence of inter-company cooperation and pipeline sharing explains some of the disparate costs and deductions. 85 In one example, a single well had four companies involved, and each company calculated different postproduction costs. 86 84 Id. Note that the lack of information made available at the time of the SEREC Hearing made it impossible to determine an exact number. 85 Id. Pickett, post-production cost deductions come mostly from gathering line systems, and multiple companies use the same gathering line system.
87
In addition, and post-Kilmer, select companies have been taking retroactive deductions from royalty checks.
88 Some retroactive deductions have equaled tens of thousands of dollars, and some companies have stopped paying royalties to landowners until all retroactive bills have been paid. 89 According to Doug McLinko, Bradford County Commissioner, his conversations with commissioners in other states indicated similar concerns, particularly with one company. In 2012, gas companies paid $731 million in total royalties that were divided among tens of thousands of taxpaying royalty owners in Pennsylvania. 91 Unfortunately, the excessive royalty deductions deprive the entire Commonwealth of tax revenue.
92 Daryl Miller, another Bradford County Commissioner, loosely estimated that in the last six months of 2012, Pennsylvania missed out on about $10 million that would have circulated through the local economy and generated tax revenue. 93 In addition to lost revenue from excessive deductions, out-of-state attorneys are offering to represent landowners for a portion of landowners' royalty fees over the course of several years. 94 Diverting royalty payments as income to out-of-state attorneys further deprives Pennsylvania of tax revenue. 95 In fact, Jackie Root, President of NARO-PA, described royalty payments as a finite resource that requires preservation. 
c. Leases Signed in Good Faith
When Bradford County, Pennsylvania residents signed their leases, lessees advised residents that they would receive the full royalty payments without deductions. 97 Even those residents who have protective, no-deduction addenda in their leases still see deductions. 98 According to attorney Christopher D. Jones, gas companies themselves, not the landmen who first negotiated the leases, are breaking promises and lease addenda. 99 In particular, at the time of the SEREC Hearing, Chesapeake had been deducting costs from leases that contained protective market enhancement clauses. 100 The deductions reflected a payment arrangement Chesapeake had with one of its own subsidiaries. 101 The deduction issue centers on the fact that most Pennsylvania natural gas leases are older leases signed in good faith pre-Kilmer. 102 Mike Evanish, business manager for a firm providing accounting to 5,000 Farm Bureau members, stated that the "idea of deductions was never on the table at any meeting" he attended, nor was it part of any discussion that he had with attorneys regarding gas production.
103
Under the circumstances, royalty owners continue to feel betrayed. 104 They and witnesses at the SEREC Hearing think that the GMRA was meant to address the current royalty deductions issue and that the Commonwealth has failed to protect landowners' financial interests. 105 According to McLinko, royalties lost to deductions could have helped retirees and others who need the income. 106 As such, he wants those who signed their leases in good faith pre-Kilmer to have their guarantees restored. During the SEREC Hearing, other concerns arose regarding Chesapeake's royalty payment deductions. Jones explained that on a single accounting spreadsheet that listed six landowners with interest in a single well, under each landowner, Chesapeake listed different per-month gas production volumes from that well. 108 Chesapeake also listed a different gas price for each landowner. 109 Additionally, some of the per-month gas production volumes repeated in a noticeable pattern. 110 Based on the production reports, Jones could not determine how much gas Chesapeake actually produced per month at the well.
111
Pennsylvania Department of Environmental Protection ("DEP") records did not help to clarify volume reports. 112 According to Jones, the DEP website only listed total days and total volumes of production, not daily, weekly, or monthly amounts. 113 Even if the DEP website listed more incremental volumes, the selfreporting of production volumes without independent verification would continue to leave doubts about actual production. As several parties testified to at the SEREC Hearing, and as the Kilmer court addressed, Pennsylvania lacks a statutory definition of the term "royalty." 115 The absence of a statutory definition has contributed to the lack of uniformity among royalty payments and deductions and will likely limit the ability of land and royalty owners to pursue legal redress. 116 As happened in Kilmer, in disputes over 108 Id. Some landowners worry that openly expressing their concerns will adversely affect production. 118 Additionally, although landowner organizations retain accounting services, only lawyers, not accountants, can attempt to reconcile paystubs with lease agreements. 119 Retaining legal services on top of accounting services would increase the expenses to royalty owners, some of whom may not have the financial resources for either service. 120 Moreover, landowners who have simply tried reaching out to companies have had no success receiving explanations for deductions. 121 Reportedly, some companies' employees simply did not know what the deductions were.
122 Furthermore, Root stated that she only received clarification of financial statements because her gas lease included special provisions, and without those provisions, she might have received no information at all. At the SEREC Hearing, State Senator Gene Yaw brought up the idea that royalty owners could seek a legal accounting to define and determine the propriety of royalty payment deductions. 124 In Pennsylvania, although no longer a procedural action in equity, an accounting is available as a civil action that can provide equitable relief. 125 In an accounting action, when one party "allege[s] that an opposing party has received moneys . . . in any . . . capacity in which he or she is bound to account, or where the" first party cannot cite the precise amount due because the opposing party has failed to account to the first party, the first party has the right to an accounting. 126 A plaintiff may establish the right to an accounting by showing that a valid contract between the parties existed and that the defendant breached his or her contractual duty. 127 When a right to an accounting exists, Pennsylvania courts will recognize an accounting as the sole relief sought. 128 Unfortunately, the added expense of legal accountings effectively prohibits their use. Additionally, leases with arbitration clauses prevent court action, including an accounting, and have prohibitive costs-filing for arbitration can cost up to $10,000. Although NARO and the Farm Bureau provide gas lease education for members, those organizations do not provide legal representation. 130 Additionally, the agricultural community generally tends to be non-litigious, 131 and royalty owners tend to lack the financial resources to pursue legal action against large corporations.
132 Because of high litigation costs, the main avenue for recovering improper deductions would arguably be a class action lawsuit. However, in a successful class action, class representatives and their law firms, rather than the majority of class members, receive most of the benefits.
133 While many royalty owners might be able to protect themselves through non-deduction clauses in new leases, not all companies have honored these clauses. 134 Furthermore, the same 126 Id. § 81:3 (citations omitted). According to Root, companies that violate market enhancement clauses do so because they face little to no risk. 136 If these companies go to arbitration, they may or may not have to pay the royalty.
137 Even if they are forced to pay the royalty, they still may not have to pay interest or penalties. 138 Additionally, companies play the odds that royalty owners will not sue, in which case those companies will not pay anything at all.
139
Although royalty owners often do not sue gas companies, 140 some royalty owners did file a class action lawsuit against Chesapeake alleging underpayment of gas royalties. 141 On September 3, 2013, news reports stated that Chesapeake "agreed to pay $7.5 million to settle" the dispute.
142 Thousands of leaseholders had joined together to sue Chesapeake's subsidiary, Chesapeake Appalachia, LLC, for allegedly "wrongly charging fees related to process[ing]," refining, and transporting natural gas. 143 The federal lawsuit named fourteen representative plaintiffs from one New York county and five Pennsylvania counties. 144 152 Kilmer v. Elexco Land Servs., Inc., 990 A.2d 1147, 1157 n.14 (Pa. 2010) ("We note that the General Assembly is the branch of government best suited to weigh the public polices underlying the determination of the proper point of royalty valuation in the deregulated gas industry. However, until the General Assembly acts to specify the point of valuation, we must interpret the statute as written, prior to deregulation."). 153 See SEREC Hearing, supra note 4. 154 See generally id. Sikes requested that the General Assembly prohibit producers from defining the term "royalty." 157 A Bradford County solicitor also asked legislators to define the term "valuation." 158 The SEREC Hearing elicited a common concern about the constitutional applicability of a statutory definition to old leases, but the only answer that emerged was that any definition would apply to future leaseholds. Joel Rotz, President of the Pennsylvania Farm Bureau, discussed the need for a common sense approach to promote transparency in royalty paystubs and the deduction of post-production costs. 160 That approach seeks disclosure on check stubs of additional, purportedly non-proprietary information. 161 According to Rotz, providing more information on paystubs "maintains credibility and trust with royalty owners," especially since the deduction of post-production costs undermines the trust and support that the natural gas industry has earned among royalty owners. 162 The common sense approach dictates that if companies are allowed to make deductions, companies should do so prior to determining the minimum one-eighth royalty payment, not after. 163 At the very least, Pennsylvania legislation should promote such transparency. 164 Jones advocated increased uniformity and better verification of production volume reporting, including mandatory gas volume metering at the wellhead. 165 Jones requested that the General Assembly expand the Pennsylvania Unfair Trade Practices and Consumer Protection Law to empower landowners to better protect themselves and to empower the State Attorney General to take legal action on 156 Id. (statement of J. Rotz). 157 Id. (statement of D. Sikes). 158 Id. (statement of one Bradford County solicitor). 159 See id. (statement of G.A. Bibikos). 160 Id. (statement of J. Rotz). 161 Id. 162 Id. 163 Id. 164 Id. 166 In order to offset the costs of such additional industry oversight, Pennsylvania could enact a severance tax on natural gas production.
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IV. SHORTCOMINGS OF POST-KILMER LEGAL DEVELOPMENTS TO PROPERLY PROTECT LESSOR/ROYALTY OWNER INTERESTS REGARDING ROYALTY PAYMENTS
A. Kilmer v. Elexco in Light of the SEREC Hearing
The 2013 SEREC Hearing on royalties highlights several aspects of the Kilmer court's reasoning that do not hold up in light of recent circumstances in Pennsylvania. 168 First, many residents' leases differ from the Kilmer lease. According to Jones, many of the residents' leases lack clearly defined deductions, whereas the Kilmer lease clearly explained the deductions. 169 Second, Root argued against the "in-kind" royalty argument found in Kilmer, contending that people cannot take gas at the wellhead like they can oil and that producers no longer sell oil at the wellhead. 170 Third, and perhaps most importantly, the Kilmer court's conclusions regarding equitable payouts and gas companies' conduct fall far short of actual practice.
171
Contrary to the Kilmer court's conclusion that allowing the deduction of postproduction expenses would ensure equitability among royalty payments, the variability of deductions has resulted in vastly differing-and at times highly inequitable-royalty payments.
172 If the 1979 General Assembly had truly intended the GMRA to ensure relatively equal royalty payments as the Kilmer court asserted, then the actual implementation of the net-back method in Pennsylvania 166 Id. 167 Id. (stating that North Dakota uses severance tax funds to pay for monitoring natural gas extraction). has not met that intent. 173 Instead, deductions among similarly situated royalty owners range from zero to $40,000.
174
In addition, the excessive deductions that Chesapeake has taken indicate that the Kilmer court erred in reasoning that gas companies do not have an incentive to inflate post-production cost deductions. 175 The accepted economic theory of a firm states that a firm's primary objective is to maximize profits, and a firm maximizes profit, in part, by reducing the costs of inputs. 176 In the current situation, inputs would likely include production and post-production costs that a gas company (or a gas "firm") incurs in order to bring its gas to the desired point of sale, as well as royalty payments to lessors. A gas firm can reduce input costs-that is, production and post-production costs-by shifting them to landowners. 177 Because the GMRA has prevented gas firms from shifting production costs to lessors, gas firms have turned to deducting post-production costs as a means of offsetting input costs.
178
By deducting post-production costs from royalty payments, gas firms can reduce both their input costs and their royalty payouts, thus resulting in larger profits. As the check stubs from one company illustrate, a firm that seeks to maximize profits will shift as many input costs as possible, in the form of royalty payment deductions, to royalty owners. 179 Although the Kilmer court correctly recognized a firm's incentive to reduce costs, it incorrectly reasoned that a firm could not achieve that end by adding excessive costs as deductions to royalty payments.
180
B. The Improper Distinction Between Production and PostProduction Costs
An inherent flaw lies within the distinction between production and postproduction costs, allowing the gas industry to improperly claim deductions under the net-back method. 181 According to the reasoning of Bibikos and the gas industry (both of which the Kilmer court accepted), production applies only to the process of getting the gas out of the ground and to the wellhead. 182 However, after examining the extraction and production processes for what they truly are, it appears that some members of the industry and their advocates have convincingly substituted the term "production" for "extraction."
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Oxford Dictionaries defines "extraction" as " [t] he action of taking out something, especially using effort or force" and lists "mineral extraction" as an example of that definition. 183 Extraction, not production, should be the term that defines the process of getting the gas out of the ground and to the wellhead. Even assuming arguendo that "extraction" should not have the common dictionary definition but rather the accepted definition from industrial practice, 184 the gas industry uses the term "extraction" to refer to the process of getting gas out of the ground and to the wellhead. 185 As Kilmer and the SEREC Hearing illustrate, the production process is not uniform between and among members of the natural gas industry. 186 Because the production process is not uniform, the term "royalty" should not depend on the seemingly arbitrary distinction between production and post-production costs, nor should it ignore the plain meaning of the term "extraction."
In reality, production continues until the producer (in many modern circumstances, the extractor) generates a final product for sale and actually sells the product. 187 In other words, production stops at the point of sale of the produced 181 Id. at 1157-58. 185 See Natural Gas > Production Processes > Drilling, MARCELLUS SHALE COAL., http://marcellus coalition.org/marcellus-shale/production-processes/drilling (last visited Mar. 12, 2014) (stating that horizontal drilling "allows for the extraction of larger quantities of natural gas from a single wellhead"). 186 See Kilmer, 990 A.2d 1147; SEREC Hearing, supra note 4.
187 I recognize my generous use of the root word "produce," but I find such overuse necessary to emphasize the simplicity of the reasoning as opposed to the convoluted argument used by the gas industry to distinguish between the terms "production" and "post-production." product. 188 As Kilmer and the SEREC Hearing testimony explain, the first point of sale of natural gas in Pennsylvania originally occurred at the wellhead. 189 All production costs for producers/extractors occurred up to and stopped at that point, and producers/extractors had their end product. 190 Presently, the production of a saleable end product continues well beyond the wellhead. 191 Although different producers sell their products at different points along a line, these producers continue to refine and transport gas until they produce a marketable product. 192 The keyword here is "product." How can a company incur post-production costs if they have not yet finished producing the product that they intend to sell? Common sense says that they cannot.
193
C. Limits to the GMRA Amendments on Royalty Payment Information
The payment information amendment to the GMRA set a minimum standard for providing information that lessees must meet. 194 The newly added section 35.2 states:
Whenever payment is made for oil or gas production to an interest owner, all of the following information, at a minimum, shall be included on the check stub or on an attachment to the form of payment, unless the information is otherwise provided on a regular basis:
(1) A name, number or combination of name and number that identifies the lease, property, unit or well or wells for which payment is being made; and the county in which the lease, property or well is located.
(2) Month and year of gas production. Although a positive step toward protecting royalty owners' interests, the GMRA amendments fall short of fully addressing royalty owners' concerns. Admittedly, section 35.2 does address the lack of clarity in check stub reporting by requiring more detailed reporting. 196 However, the reporting requirement appears to be severely limited. Additionally, the GMRA amendments do not prevent the deductions that lie at the heart of the current issue, nor do they define the term "royalty."
197 Had the General Assembly adequately responded to royalty owners' concerns, the GMRA amendments would have included a definition of the term "royalty" that, at the very least, applied proactively to new leases. 198 Regarding clarity in reporting, the GMRA amendments do not address concerns that check stubs do not explain or define the nature of individual deductions.
199 Subsection 5 only requires gas companies to report to royalty owners the "[t]otal amount of severance and other production taxes and other deductions permitted under the lease."
200 However, check stubs and payment reports to royalty owners already disclose the "total amount" of deductions. Instead, problems arise when royalty owners attempt to decipher the individual components of the total 195 Id. 196 See id. deductions but, even with the aid of accountants and lawyers, are unable to do so. 201 Subsections 6 through 9 provide no further help in deciphering individual deductions because those subsections also appear to apply only to total interest, sales, and deductions. 202 Royalty owners specifically requested that the General Assembly require gas companies to provide clear, understandable explanations of individual deductions, 203 but the amendments to the GMRA fail to require such explanations.
204
D. Contradictions in the GMRA Amendments Regarding Lease Pooling
Admittedly, section 34.1 does impose an element of reasonableness for apportioning payment, that "the production shall be allocated to each lease in such proportion as the operator reasonably determines to be attributable to each lease." 205 When gas producers choose to develop Marcellus Shale gas underneath multiple properties from which the producers have leased the natural gas rights, such producers cannot arbitrarily or capriciously apportion royalty payments to owners. 206 However, absent an apportionment agreement among and between the producer and leaseholders, the producer has the statutory right to unilaterally decide what constitutes a "reasonable" apportionment. 207 Given the excessive and obscure royalty deductions that at least one gas company has been making, 208 it seems dubious to exclude royalty owners from the determination of reasonable apportionment and to assume that all gas companies will unilaterally provide reasonable apportionments. In addition, because most of the existing gas leases were signed before Act 66 came into effect, 210 it is unrealistic and unreasonable to presume that royalty owners had the foresight or knowledge to anticipate the pooling of leases. 211 In the absence of such foresight and knowledge, most, if not all, Pennsylvania gas leases signed prior to the passage of Act 66 likely do not contain apportionment provisions. 212 Unfortunately, unless or until natural gas companies agree to voluntarily alter existing leases, royalty owners will be bound by the apportionment that the company assigns. 213 Even if the parties decide to negotiate, gas companies will be operating from the default position that they do not need consent from the royalty owner to move forward with lease pooling. 214 By creating a statutory position of unilateral authority among lessee gas companies, Act 66 has greatly undermined royalty owners' negotiating power. 215 
E. Mixed Legislative Efforts to Protect Against Royalty Payment Deductions
Following Act 66 becoming law, at least three proposed bills emerged that would to limit the ability of lessees to take deductions that negatively affect royalty payments. 216 Although each bill would still allow deductions, each bill would also limit how, when, and to what extent lessees may take deductions and would guarantee that lessors receive either the one-eighth minimum royalty payment or the royalty payment specified in the lease. 217 219 H.B. 1650 presumes that the gross proceeds equal the fair market value if the sale occurred under a "good faith contract entered into by nonaffiliated parties of adverse economic interests."
220 If the contract of sale did not occur at arm's length or between nonaffiliated parties, then the lessee would have "the burden to establish that" it paid the royalties based on fair market value. 221 From the royalties, a lessee could not deduct severance tax, impact fees, Commonwealth agency fees, or post-production costs.
222 Under H.B. 1650, post-production costs include the "loss of produced volume, whether by use as fuel, line loss, flaring, venting or otherwise," as well as costs that the lessee incurs between the wellhead and point of sale, including "gathering, dehydration, compression, treatment, processing, marketing and transportation costs incurred in connection with the sale of such production." 223 Unless otherwise provided for in the terms of a lease, royalties shall be calculated on the gross value of the oil, natural gas or gas of other designation at the wellhead. The lessee may not deduct any severance taxes, impact fees or postproduction costs, including any loss of volume or costs associated with gathering, dehydration, compression, treatment, processing, transporting and marketing the product. Deductions shall only be enforceable if the value of the royalty after the deductions results in at least one-eighth, or that percentage or royalty determined by the lease, of the gross value of the oil, natural gas or gas of other designation at the wellhead.
228
Although H.B. 1732 appears to not allow lessors to receive potentially higher royalty payments based on increased value at a point of sale beyond the wellhead, 229 it at least prohibits some of the deductions that have caused great concern among royalty owners. 230 Committee ("HEREC") since being introduced and referred to it in September of 2013. 231 Another progressive bill that would have protected royalty owners, Pennsylvania House Bill 1684 ("H.B. 1684"), was unfortunately removed from the table on October 6, 2014. 232 Despite receiving one House committee's approval, the natural gas industry strongly opposed H.B. 1684 as an unconstitutional violation of existing contracts. 233 H.B. 1684 recognized in its findings and declarations that lessees have been reducing royalty payments below the minimum one-eighth guarantee and that the General Assembly has the authority to prevent lessees from taking deductions that lower payments below the minimum one-eighth guarantee. 234 H.B. 1684 adopted an extensive, but not exclusive, definition of "post-production costs." 235 It would have invalidated leases that did not provide the minimum one-eighth guaranteed royalty and would have prohibited the deduction of taxes, fees, and other production costs. 236 Additionally, H.B. 1684 would have prohibited the deduction of post-production costs or any other costs that reduced royalty payments below the one-eighth guarantee.
237 H.B. 1684 would have required lessees to calculate royalty payments based on the point of sale at the fair market value to a non-related business entity. 238 If a sale did not occur at arm's length between non-related business entities, the lessee would have had the burden of showing that it based its royalty payment on the fair market value. 239 250 However, at least one House member has affirmatively indicated a lack of opposition to both bills. 251 As of this writing, both bills have been referred to HEREC. 252 S.B. 147 would amend title 58 in the following ways: (1) adding definitions for the terms "joint venture," "lessee," and "lessor"; (2) requiring interest owners in a joint venture to provide the venture's basic identifying information and the proportionate shares/interests of the marketed oil or natural gas; (3) allowing a lessor, upon written request, to review documents relating to the determination of royalty payments once every twelve months; and (4) prohibiting the lessor from disclosing reviewed information except to an attorney or an accountant or in a judicial proceeding. 253 While requiring additional disclosure of and access to information regarding royalty determinations addresses some concerns, S.B. 147 does not list any consequences for non-compliance, 254 potentially undermining enforceability and accountability.
S.B. 148 would provide protection for a lessor who "reports a violation or suspected violation of a contractual agreement." 255 S.B. 148 allows lessors to bring a "[g]ood faith action" (one based on a reasonable belief and "without malice or ulterior motive") to secure lease rights or to determine compliance with a lease. 
V. CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS TO BETTER PROTECT ROYALTY OWNERS
Contrary to certain arguments, there appears to be no valid reason to conclude that the original GMRA codified the natural gas industry's practice of selling at the wellhead. 294 On its face, the original GMRA codified a guaranteed minimum royalty payment of one-eighth of the gas's value at the point of sale. 295 Simply because the point of sale has shifted over time, thus incurring additional production expenses, gas companies should not be free to defy a statutory mandate and reduce the royalty payments. 296 Admittedly, some companies that have leased mineral rights may very well sell their gas at the wellhead. In those cases, calculating royalty payments based on the price at the wellhead seems reasonable. However, companies that continue the process of refining and/or moving the product beyond the wellhead until they have processed the product into the proper form in which they intend to sell it have not yet finished production. For those companies, because production costs continue until they sell the product, that sale should be statutorily subject to a minimum oneeighth royalty payment to the gas rights' owners. 297 In line with the proper and generally accepted statutory minimum one-eighth requirement as many Pennsylvania royalty owners understand it, the General Assembly needs to adopt a common sense definition of "royalty" based on the proceeds from sale without deductions. As was argued in Kilmer and has since been supported by royalty owners, the commonly accepted definition of the term "royalty" is "a compensation or portion of the proceeds paid to the owner of a right, as a patent or oil or mineral right."
298 By adopting the common definition the term,
